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Collaborating with the ‘more capable’ self: Achieving conceptual change in early 
science education through underlying knowledge structures 
 
Abstract 
 
It is well-documented that children do not begin school as blank slates but that they bring 
with them extensive knowledge about how the world around them works. This conceptual 
knowledge, embedded within rich theoretical structures, is not always accurate and requires 
change through learning and instruction. Yet some ideas – such as object motion – appear to 
be particularly resistant to such change. So how can conceptual change be achieved or 
facilitated? Collaboration, for one, has long been recognised as a beneficial learning and 
teaching approach, including early science education. However, for deep-rooted ideas 
collaborating with others may not always have the desired impact. Instead, the notion of self-
collaboration is considered in this review. The current state of research in the field of 
predictive and underlying knowledge in childhood is outlined and different models of how 
the knowledge systems relate to each other are discussed. While further work is still needed 
to establish a clearer picture of how self-collaboration might effect conceptual change, 
research to-date clearly identifies significant differences between predictive and underlying 
knowledge structures throughout childhood, how these structures can be related to traditional 
conceptual change theories, and how they may play a role in future learning and instructional 
approaches. 
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Conceptions in the early science classroom 
 
 It is widely acknowledged that children are not blank slates when they begin school. 
On the contrary; they hold a wide range of well-developed theoretical conceptual structures, 
and many ideas – particularly in science – are based on their extensive experiences of and 
interactions with the everyday physical world around them (Klaassen, 2005). However, many 
of these ideas are erroneous or incomplete. Such inconsistencies have been widely noted, 
with currently over 8,000 studies having been collated to illustrate this point (see Duit, 2009, 
for a comprehensive list). One particular aspect of science is that of object motion – 
understanding how objects move under consideration of different variables such as 
gravitational force or friction. The importance of this area is due to the rather extensive 
opportunities for everyday world experiences, practically from birth (Planinic, Boone, 
Krsnik, & Beilfuss, 2006). As far as children’s predictions are concerned, we now know a 
good deal about what their theories are and how they relate to scientifically acceptable ideas, 
with children displaying notions largely incommensurate with accepted scientific views (see 
Howe, 1998, for a review).  
 Having such ideas in childhood may not seem critical, since they are perceived to be 
sufficient to navigate within the everyday world (Reif, 2008). Furthermore, the purpose of 
education should be to facilitate change in conceptions – to encourage the modification of 
personal knowledge or theories – and to instil correct views, so there should be opportunities 
for such change when necessary. Yet we also know that adults hold very similar views 
regarding object fall in particular (e.g. Cahyadi & Butler, 2004; Sequeira & Leite, 1991). 
Such ideas are highly resistant to change through instruction and interfere with further 
learning of related concepts (Bloom & Weisberg, 2007; Duit, Treagust, & Widodo, 2008). 
Given such resistance conceptual change needs to be addressed early. Looking at these 
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concepts in childhood to see whether they can be changed at this stage – before ideas become 
too resistant to change – is crucial. Despite problems with conceptual change in the context of 
science education, all children are believed to hold the capacity for conceptual change 
(Carey, 2000). This raises the question as to why some conceptions do not change.  
A key approach to conceptual change is outlined by Posner, Strike, Hewson and 
Gertzog (1982). According to this approach there are four conditions that need to be met 
before conceptual change can occur: 1) there must be dissatisfaction with the existing 
conception, 2) a new and intelligible conception must be available, 3) the new conception 
must appear plausible, and 4) the new conception should open up to new fruitful research. 
The final condition is not seen to be relevant for most primary school children. The main 
problem, however, seems to lie in the fact that the first two conditions are frequently not met 
effectively – students will, for example, conduct an experiment and find that their predictions 
are not met, but instead of reformulating their theories they may place blame on other factors 
such as the experimental setup (Howe, 2012). Importantly, Posner et al.’s theory is, to their 
own acknowledgement, merely epistemological, and the approach has shown little positive 
effect in its applications to classroom teaching (cf. Duit et al., 2008). However, what if the 
conditions of their theory can be met by using a different approach? Using object motion as a 
key example to highlight its potential application, an alternative of self-collaboration is 
explored next. 
 
Collaborating with the ‘more capable’ self 
 
 Collaboration plays a key role in several traditional approaches to education. Piaget 
(1985), Vygotsky (1978) and Bruner (1996) all emphasise the importance of interaction in 
learning – though they may differ in their views as to how exactly interaction benefits the 
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learner. It is unquestionable, though, that regardless of the exact mechanisms, collaboration 
among peers or with more knowledgeable adults can be a useful approach to effecting 
conceptual change in early science education in general (Howe, 2009, 2010; Howe, 
McWilliam, & Cross, 2005). However, such approaches may not always be most effective. 
Certainly where ideas are deeply entrenched due to experiences with the everyday world 
practically from the first day of our lives – as is the case for object motion – even 
collaboration with more capable peers or adults may not suffice in meeting the conditions set 
out by Posner et al. (1982). This may be because the plausibility of new or alternative 
conceptions is not given, or because the collaborator’s views are not ‘trusted’ enough (Howe, 
2013). As a result conflicting ideas are rarely resolved; particularly in younger children’s 
science classroom interactions (cf. Howe & McWilliam, 2006). However, collaboration in a 
different manner could still be seen as a potential solution to the conceptual change problem 
– that is, by seeking collaboration with the underlying self.  
 Over the past thirty years a significant body of work has built up that demonstrates 
infants do not live in a world of “blooming buzzing confusion” (James, 1890, p. 488), but that 
they are in fact, among many other things, capable intuitive physicists who are able to 
interpret the world around them according to how they expect it to behave. Many studies 
have demonstrated that babies understand principles related to object motion, such as what 
kind of trajectories objects should follow (e.g. Friedman, 2002; Kannass, Oakes, & Wiese, 
1999; Kim & Spelke, 1992). By relying on some form of internal reasoning system that 
monitors events, infants respond to scenarios that violate their expectations of how an event 
should have occurred, in accordance to physical laws, by spending more time looking at and 
scrutinising these incorrect events (Baillargeon, 2004). The assumption is that humans are 
born with what is termed core knowledge (e.g. Kinzler & Spelke, 2007) and these core beliefs 
represent an initial theory of the physical world.  
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According to the core knowledge view, these beliefs should also stand at the centre of 
adults’ understanding, and while they can be enhanced through additional or new knowledge, 
the core itself cannot be altered (Carey, 2009). Indeed, research with professional ball players 
shows that while they are successful on a playing field, knowing where to be to catch a ball 
and what kind of trajectory that ball will follow, they cannot explain this knowledge and they 
perform poorly on related pencil-and-paper tasks (Reed, McLeod, & Dienes, 2010). 
Similarly, there are studies showing adults are able to recognise dynamic trajectories 
correctly, even if their predictions are incorrect (Kaiser & Proffitt, 1984; Kaiser, Profitt, 
Whelan, & Hecht, 1992; Shanon, 1976). Importantly, this ability to ‘do’ or ‘see’ not only 
differs from the ability to explicitly know, but it also seems to be decidedly different from 
guessing, for which performance success rates should be much lower (cf. Fu, Dienes, & Fu, 
2010).  
 If underlying knowledge exists in childhood and it needs to become available to 
children so that conceptual change can occur, what is the best approach? The method 
traditionally used to evaluate what babies know about physical laws does not work very well 
beyond around the first year of age (Rosenberg & Carey, 2009). Instead, judgement tasks can 
be used, by enforcing decisions as to whether an event appears to be correct or incorrect 
(Broaders, Cook, Mitchell, & Goldin-Meadow, 2007). Particularly helpful in this respect are 
computer simulations, as in addition to demonstrating events that should elicit feelings of 
familiarity they also allow the creation of dynamic events that cannot exist and therefore 
would not be observable in the everyday world because physical laws would have to be 
violated (Hennessy, 2006; Hennessy et al., 2007). Moreover, the role of digital technologies 
has become more and more important in educational contexts, including in the primary 
classroom (e.g. Livingstone, 2012; Porter, 2013). As such it offers an excellent opportunity to 
approach conceptual change from a new perspective and to evaluate new techniques. 
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Research with children in this area is still limited, but relevant studies are beginning 
to emerge. Howe, Taylor Tavares and Devine (2012) conducted a computer-based study with 
primary school aged children, assessing their predictions and recognition of the trajectories of 
objects being dropped from a moving hot air balloon. Predictions mainly fell into the 
category of straight-down or backward parabolic motion trajectories and only rarely into the 
correct forward parabolic trajectory category. In contrast, when required to decide whether a 
shown trajectory was correct or incorrect these children were quite able to recognise that the 
forward parabolic motion trajectory was correct, rejecting the remaining two. Taylor Tavares, 
Howe and Devine (2009) showed similar effects with the same age groups, though focusing 
on motion direction along a horizontal. 
 Hast and Howe (2010) also investigated 5 to 11-year-olds’ underlying recognition of 
various dynamic events by specifically focussing on the role of object mass, since this 
element seems to play such a crucial role in predictive theories. At the same time, it should 
bear no effect on the ability to recognise dynamic events since speed, even taking into 
account air resistance or friction, has little effect on the speeds of two balls identical in size 
and differing only in their mass. Indeed, while predictions of speed of a heavy and a light ball 
were largely erroneous, as in other research (Baker, Murray, & Hood, 2009; Chinn & 
Malhotra, 2002; Hast & Howe, 2012, 2013a, b; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Nachtigall, 1982; 
van Hise, 1988), most children were able to correctly identify dynamic events as correct 
when they showed natural same-speed object motion and to reject events where one ball was 
simulated to be faster than the other.  
 Interestingly, the children in Hast and Howe (2010) were much more accurate in their 
rejections when the simulation events did not match their predictions. That is to say, while 
overall they were able to select the correct events as correct they also often judged the – 
incorrect – event to be correct that matched their predictions, but rarely the event that was 
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neither correct nor matched predictions. Howe et al. (2012) found similarly that while the 
correct forward parabolic motion was recognised as being correct children frequently 
accepted incorrect trajectories as being correct in a manner that reflected their predictions but 
not so for trajectories that neither were correct nor had been predicted. 
 
An explanatory model of underlying knowledge 
 
 Prediction tasks seem to necessitate deliberation, reflection, and a conscious 
understanding of rules or decisions involved, that is, an explicit engagement with knowledge 
structures (cf. Plessner & Czenna, 2008). At the same time, we have seen that primary school 
aged children are able to recognise dynamic trajectories that are physically correct and to 
reject trajectories that appear unnatural to them, even if they are more likely to predict the 
unnatural events beforehand. It has been hypothesised that such recognition tasks may need 
merely to engage underlying knowledge structures (Collins, 2010; Polanyi, 1967) – structures 
set to provide quick responses without conscious awareness but eliciting feelings of 
familiarity (Scott & Dienes, 2010).  
 There are currently at least three different views on the relationship between 
expressed and underlying knowledge models. The first view posits that explicit knowledge is 
merely underlying knowledge elevated to a new level, and inaccuracies in expressed 
knowledge are explained as a result of omission of knowledge elements during the process of 
elevation (Kim & Spelke, 1999; Spelke & Hespos, 2001). The second view holds that there 
are two coexisting systems, each unaffected by the other, and depending on the task 
requirements, only one system is accessed (Hogarth, 2001; Plessner & Czenna, 2008). The 
third view, in contrast, rejects both omission and separation, and proposes a hybrid model in 
which there are two, partially associated knowledge systems wherein explicitly expressed 
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knowledge is, at least in part, an embellishment of underlying knowledge (Carey, 2009; Hast 
& Howe, 2010; Howe et al., 2012). The question that remains is, then, how the two 
knowledge representations are linked. Which of the three theories is most likely to account 
for the differences?  
The research with children outlined earlier would suggest that the omission theory 
cannot be upheld. For if the disparity observed by Hast and Howe (2010) were due to 
omission of conceptual elements then deliberation should call upon underlying knowledge 
and leave elements out. However, given that in actuality object mass plays a very minor role 
in relevant dynamic events correct recognition would not need to depend on any 
understanding of mass. Yet children clearly specifically call upon mass in their largely 
erroneous predictions – adding conceptual information rather than omitting any.  
Arguing between separate systems and the hybrid model is a more formidable task at 
this stage. Mathematical research, for one, can help reject the notion of separate systems. 
Explicit mathematical computations are carried out on the basis of several underlying 
processes, such as approximate representations of numerical magnitudes (cf. Stanescu-
Cosson et al., 2000). When such underlying processes are damaged, mental arithmetic suffers 
as a result (Lemer, Dehaene, Spelke, & Cohen, 2003), suggesting the underlying and the 
explicit representations must be linked in some manner. As a result the research on motion 
recognition (Hast & Howe, 2010; Howe et al., 2012) suggests an overlap of systems, but 
merely through partial association. In both studies recognition performance was generally 
accurate, but not always – and where it was incorrect it was far more likely to reflect 
predictive knowledge of dynamics rather than any alternative view. 
Hast (2011) details a model that explores the possible relationship between predictive 
and underlying knowledge (see Fig. 1). Earlier the notion was introduced that humans are 
endowed with a set of core knowledge principles and systems (cf. Kinzler & Spelke, 2007). 
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According to the model these principles and systems are, in appropriate combinations, 
loosely connected to form prototypical representations of, for instance, dynamic events. In 
recognition tasks we may merely need to map witnessed events onto the relevant model and 
depending on the goodness of fit between actual event and prototype we then either accept or 
reject that event’s correctness. The models relied on in predictive reasoning, on the other 
hand, require some incorporation of symbolic representations (e.g. language, mathematics or 
maps), and this incorporation may be interfering with the process of fully accessing the 
underlying structures at an explicit level. 
 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
 
 
Applications to education and future directions 
 
More interesting for educationalists might now be whether this knowledge 
differentiation – in whatever form it manifests itself – has any applicability to the classroom 
in effecting conceptual change. The short-term answer is in the affirmative and is 
demonstrated by a recently published study by Howe, Devine and Taylor Tavares (2013). 
Between them, 8- to 12-year-olds generally demonstrated similar levels of predictive 
knowledge about fall events in a pre-test. Some of these children then worked with an 
intervention program developed on the basis of Howe et al. (2012) where the children worked 
with recognition tasks; the remainder did not follow the intervention. A post-test on 
predictions given several weeks later showed that those children who had worked with the 
program were now much more successful in their predictions, whereas the control group’s 
results mostly remained static. 
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What seems to be the case is that the computer program elicited personal 
dissatisfaction with concepts already held, evident by the rejection of incorrect scenarios. In 
addition, a new conception was available, and it was a plausible conception because it was 
recognised to be correct by the ‘more competent’ self. All crucial conditions laid out by 
Posner et al. (1982) can be met here. There has been some discussion about interventions and 
timing, raising the question of how much time is needed to effect conceptual change. 
Frequently, change can still occur several weeks after intervention (e.g. Howe et al., 2005), 
and long-term evaluations may be needed to provide a more accurate picture. So as such the 
findings provided by Howe et al. (2013) may need to be treated with some caution but they 
certainly provide an optimistic outlook.  
A further point that has been addressed in the past is that many primary school 
teachers show low levels of confidence when it comes to teaching physical science topics 
(Murphy & Beggs, 2005). Integrating underlying knowledge assessment can provide at least 
two benefits here. Firstly, teachers can work on their own conceptions – an unpublished 
follow-up study based on Howe et al. (2013)1 showed that adults, too, are able to address a 
change in conceptions using such programs. Doing so could, as a result, help develop 
confidence in teaching science topics. Secondly, teachers can avoid unsuccessful 
superimposition of ideas by letting children access their personal underlying knowledge 
systems. In either case teacher willingness to engage with such technologies is needed in 
order for benefits to be applied (Ifenthaler & Schweinbenz, 2013). Working together with 
teachers in future research undertakings is therefore crucial to understand how they 
incorporate such assessment possibilities into their classroom activities. 
                                                 
1 See http://www.educ.cam.ac.uk/research/projects/objectmotion/classroomuse-download/ where the software 
used during the intervention phase of Howe et al. (2013) is also available. 
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So while there may currently not be any clear indication whether approaching 
conceptual change in this fashion may have long-term benefits or what these benefits may be 
– simply because the research is too recent to be able to reach any such conclusions – there is 
already a call for continued work. It has been proposed that future research could particularly 
expand into other areas showing similar conceptual issues as found with object motion, such 
as floating and sinking, or heating and cooling (Hast, 2012; Howe et al., 2013). Moreover, the 
usefulness of this knowledge distinction may also provide applications in other educational 
fields where underlying rules play some role, such as learning of mathematics or grammar. 
Especially given the notion of underlying knowledge appearing to exist in both of these 
particular areas – innate numerical understanding (see Dehaene, 2011, for an extensive 
review) or the slightly more debated notion of innate grammar (e.g. Chomsky, 2007) – one 
might expect similar dichotomies between predictive and underlying knowledge, which could 
serve as opportunity for conceptual change programmes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
With high resistance to conceptual change being an issue to overcome in early science 
education, new approaches need to be taken into consideration. What has been shown in this 
review is that we do not need to move away from traditional theoretical approaches per se. 
Looking particularly at the emphasis on collaboration to advance knowledge and skills 
(Bruner, 1996; Piaget, 1985; Vygotsky, 1978), it seems we can draw parallels to these ideas 
although no interaction with others needs to take place. Instead we have seen that self-
collaboration by addressing underlying knowledge structures could provide a suitable 
solution as all relevant conditions outlined by Posner et al. (1982) can be met. It appears that 
humans may be endowed with a core repertoire of knowledge and skills from a very early age 
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on, and that humans maintain this core throughout their lifespan. Being aware of this provides 
a take-home message for teachers in particular, but also for researchers interested in science 
education (or indeed other areas of education) – the knowledge expressed by children may 
not necessarily demonstrate the actual limits of what they already know. 
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Figure 1. A dual-pathway model of reasoning (Hast, 2011). 
 
